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HANDLING CLAIMS OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
REJECTING FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AS THE
BEST AVENUE FOR ADDRESSING CLAIMS OF
INNOCENCE BASED ON DNA EVIDENCE
Matthew J. Mueller+
The development of fast, reliable, and affordable means of forensic
DNA testing has revealed imperfections in our criminal justice system,
especially in the prosecution of violent crimes at the state level. The In-
nocence Project of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law alone has
documented 183 DNA-based exonerations, including eighteen in 2005.'
As a result, state prisoners have resorted to invoking the remedy of fed-
eral habeas corpus, amongst other potential avenues. Habeas relief in
such cases is a statutory means for collateral attack of state court judg-
ments.2 The basis and procedure for the federal review of state convic-
tions can only be properly understood as a legislatively and judicially
defined writ that is distinct from the "Great Writ" as understood by the
Framers.3 Although Congress and the Supreme Court expanded the use
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Peter B. Rutledge for his valuable assis-
tance, the editors and staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their hard work and
dedication, and his wife Diane for her unwavering support.
1. The Innocence Project, Case Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/index.
php (follow "Browse chronological listing" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." Id. Proponents of a broad application of federal habeas corpus often
invoke the "Great Writ" embodied in Article I, Section 9-a fallacious argument. The writ
of habeas corpus that allows state prisoners to attack their conviction in federal court is
legislatively and judicially derived and differs immensely from the "Great Writ" (a pretrial
remedy for testing the propriety of one's incarceration by the government). See Office of
Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Habeas
Corpus Review of State Judgments, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 907-08 (1989) (recom-
mending the abolition of federal habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy for state pris-
oners). "These two writs have fundamentally different functions and are directed against
the actions of different governments. They have nothing in common but a name." Id. at
907. That the original writ was intended as a check against executive detention by the
federal government and not detention by the state governments is supported by its pres-
ence in Article I, Section 9 and its absence from Article I, Section 10. Id. at 918-19. For a
dated but seminal view on the issue, see Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collat-
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of the writ of habeas corpus primarily to address preserved claims of con-
stitutional error in state court proceedings, the Court has appeared to
extend the writ even further in recent cases. The Court seems to have
carved a niche into its habeas jurisprudence that allows strong claims of
actual innocence to remedy otherwise improper habeas petitions.4
This Comment explores this niche as it relates to post-conviction DNA
testing. Part I briefly reviews the development of the Supreme Court's
habeas corpus jurisprudence with an emphasis on state prisoners' claims
of actual innocence5 with or without constitutional claims. House v. Bell
is given particular attention, as the petitioner's potential freestanding
claim of innocence was based, in part, on exculpatory DNA evidence.6
Part II examines arguments in favor of and in opposition to a more ex-
pansive view of federal habeas corpus, and addresses alternative solu-
tions to the issue of actual innocence claims. Executive clemency and
legislative remedies are discussed in this section.
In light of the concerns regarding the state of federal habeas corpus ad-
dressed in Part II, Part III comments on the utility of federal habeas re-
eral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970) (proposing that
collateral attack should only be allowed when the petitioner has "a colorable claim of
innocence" to supplement his constitutional claim). Judge Friendly was an early critic of
the widespread invocation of federal habeas corpus when the prisoner's guilt is not seri-
ously contested:
After trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court, in proceedings where the defendant had the assistance of counsel at
every step, the criminal process, in Winston Churchill's phrase, has not reached the
end, or even the beginning of the end, but only the end of the beginning. Any mur-
mur of dissatisfaction with this situation provokes immediate incantation of the Great
Writ, with the inevitable initial capitals, often accompanied by a suggestion that the
objector is the sort of person who would cheerfully desecrate the Ark of the Cove-
nant.
Id. Judge Friendly goes on to note that this expansion of habeas corpus is "almost un-
known" in England, the country from which we inherited the writ. Id. at 145.
4. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317-21 (1995); see also George C. Thomas III et
al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U.
PITT. L. REV. 263, 264-65 (2003) (arguing for a very limited exception in the actual inno-
cence context). The authors contend that such an exception is "grounded firmly in due
process of law when the Court's due process principles are applied to the world of criminal
justice that now includes DNA as well as persuasive evidence that the police often arrest
innocent people." Id. at 265.
5. For the purposes of this Comment, "actual innocence" is defined as arising when
the accused is innocent of the crime and not merely "legally innocent." Similarly, it is not
defined by whether the defendant raised the claim at trial, but by considering all the evi-
dence in the case. See LISA R. KREEGER & DANIELLE M. WEISS, AM. PROSECUTORS
RESEARCH INST., DNA EVIDENCE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROSECUTOR 17
n.20 (2004), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/dna-evidence-policy-considerations
_2004.pdf.
6. See House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 686 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (find-
ing House's case to be an example of a truly persuasive claim of actual innocence), rev'd,
126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
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view given the many state developments in the area of post-conviction
remedies for prisoners with exculpatory or potentially exculpatory DNA
evidence. Additionally, Part III raises the issue, infrequently discussed in
this debate, of justice to the victims of violent crimes. Part IV concludes
with the assertion that newly discovered DNA evidence is best addressed
at the state level. This approach would not only solve many of the
Court's concerns regarding comity, federalism, and finality, but would
also address the pitfall of flooding the federal courts with habeas claims.
Justice Robert Jackson recognized this problem as early as 1953 when he
lamented: "He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search."8
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WRIT AND STATE PRISONER CLAIMS
A. An Expansive View of the Writ
The tension between the need for finality in state criminal proceedings
and the right of state prisoners to have their claims reviewed in federal
court characterizes the Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence.9  In
Brown v. Allen, the Court held that the exhaustion of state remedies re-
7. The prevalence of wrongful convictions is disputed and some commentators even
question whether the occasional incarceration or even execution of an innocent person is
cause for alarm. Compare Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 72 (1987) (commenting that ac-
cording to the authors' study, twenty-three persons believed by the authors to be innocent
have been executed), with Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Inno-
cence Claims After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 489 (1998) (noting that the
vast majority of those convicted of crimes in our system are in fact guilty), and Ernest van
den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1664-65 (1986)
(arguing that capital punishment is a useful social and moral tool and therefore excusable
even if Bedau and others are correct in reporting that twenty-three innocent people have
been executed between 1900 and 1985), and John McAdams, It's Good, and We're Going
to Keep It: A Response to Ronald Tabak, 33 CONN. L. REV. 819, 833-834 (2001) (disputing
whether the litany of "executed innocents" that Bedau and others cite were actually inno-
cent).
8. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
9. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) (recognizing the conflict between finality
and the personal liberty of state prisoners: "conventional notions of finality in criminal
litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitu-
tional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied"); cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
90 (1977) (describing the importance of the perception that a state criminal trial is a "deci-
sive and portentous event"). Justice Powell expounded on the issue of finality in a 1986
opinion:
Balanced against the prisoner's interest in access to a forum to test the basic justice
of his confinement are the interests of the State in administration of its criminal stat-
utes. Finality serves many of those important interests. Availability of unlimited fed-
eral collateral review to guilty defendants frustrates the State's legitimate interest in
deterring crime ....
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,452 (1986) (plurality opinion).
2006]
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quirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a prerequisite to federal habeas re-
view of a state court conviction, was met with one trip through the state
appellate process, ending with denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court.' ° This interpretation expanded the availability of habeas
review of state judgments, in apparent contradiction to the legislative
history of § 2254.11 After Brown, a state prisoner only needed to use the
state's available appellate process to qualify for federal habeas corpus; he
need not file repeated state habeas applications to meet the exhaustion of
state remedies requirement. 2
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Jackson addressed the con-
flict between state and federal interests as well as the utility of federal
review of final state court judgments." He traced the problem before the
Court in this case to a three-fold trend. 14 Justice Jackson posited that
overuse of the writ has resulted from (1) the Court's use of the broad
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow federal interference with
state matters; (2) a departure from the rule of law with respect to deter-
minations of due process in favor of case-by-case determinations based
on "personal notions of justice"; and (3) the erosion of measures to pre-
vent abuse of the writ.1
5
Additionally, Justice Jackson bemoaned the expansion of habeas cor-
pus from its original purpose to an overused tool for attacking state court
findings of fact.' Justice Jackson's skeptical view of this body of law
frames the issue at several levels of generality. 7 He espoused the need
10. Brown, 344 U.S. at 447,487.
11. Id. at 448-50; see also Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 3, at
942 (arguing that Brown v. Allen represents an example of the Court departing from the
plain language of the federal habeas corpus statute to expand its scope).
12. Brown, 344 U.S. at 487.
13. Id. at 532-34 (Jackson, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 532.
15. Id. Justice Jackson discussed habeas review of state judgments as another exam-
ple of the federal government's overreaching:
The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indeterminate as to what state
actions are forbidden that this Court has found it a ready instrument, in one field or
another, to magnify federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the states. The
expansion now has reached a point where any state court conviction, disapproved by a
majority of this Court, thereby becomes unconstitutional and subject to nullification
by habeas corpus.
Id. at 534.
16. Id. at 532-33 ("The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by
executive authorities without judicial trial.").
17. Justice Jackson, though concurring in the judgment, was clearly concerned with
the Court's trend toward expanding the "substantive grounds for habeas corpus." Id. at
533-34. So while the narrow thrust of his concurrence simply demands that federal courts
only entertain federal habeas petitions in narrow situations, id. at 545, he frames the issue
with wider concerns about the Court's broad view of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 532-34.
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for strict adherence to procedure so that federal judges can "distinguish a
probable constitutional grievance from a convict's mere gamble on per-
suading some indulgent judge to let him out of jail."18 The judicial view
of federal habeas corpus that Justice Jackson rejected in Brown v. Allen
continued to expand with the Court's decision in Fay v. Noia.1 9 In this
case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied relief to Noia because he failed to appeal his conviction in
state court, despite the State of New York's stipulation that his confes-
sion was coerced in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The Court
21
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and set aside his conviction.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Noia's failure to appeal was
not a failure to exhaust state remedies merely because the time for direct
appeal had lapsed.z
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found that the prerequisite
exhaustion of state remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 referred to state
remedies open to the prisoner "at the time he files his application for
habeas corpus in the federal court."23 Justice Brennan expounded the
view of habeas corpus that Justice Jackson decried ten years earlier: "[I]ts
function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for what-
ever society deems to be intolerable restraints."24 The only constraint
placed upon a prisoner who failed to appeal his conviction in state court
was to deny federal relief where the applicant "deliberately by-passed"
his appeal and thus forfeited his state remedies.n This expansive view
remained for nearly two decades despite opposition on the Court.2 6
18. Id. at 536. "It really has become necessary to plead nothing more than that the
prisoner is in jail, wants to get out, and thinks it is illegal to hold him." Id. at 540-41.
19. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963).
20. Id. at 395-96 & n.2.
21. Id. at 396-97.
22. Id. at 399.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 401-02 ("[In a civilized society, government must always be accountable to
the judiciary for a man's imprisonment ...").
25. Id. at 438-39. ("If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel
or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate
his federal claims in the state courts ... it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny
him all relief .... ).
26. Id. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("While it may be that the Court's 'decision today
swings open no prison gates,' the Court must admit in all candor that it effectively swings
closed the doors of justice in the face of the State, since it certainly cannot prove its case 20
years after the fact.").
2006]
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B. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts Rein in Federal Habeas Relief for
State Prisoners
1. Wainwright v. Sykes: Expansive View Overruled in Favor of "Cause"
and "Prejudice" Test
The availability of habeas relief for claims not raised or heard during
the prisoner's state proceedings continued to present a problem to the
federal judiciary after Noia.7 In Wainwright v. Sykes, prisoner Sykes
challenged, for the first time in his state habeas petition, incriminating
statements made in violation of his Miranda rights.8 He neither raised
the issue in a pretrial hearing nor made a timely objection at trial as Flor-
ida law required . On certiorari, the Supreme Court faced the question
of whether violation of Florida's contemporaneous objection require-
ment was sufficient to bar federal habeas review.0 Justice Rehnquist, in
his majority opinion, rejected the "deliberate by-pass" standard of Noia,31
and instead adopted the rule of Francis v. Henderson,32 which required a
showing of "cause" and "prejudice" before federal habeas review is
available in the face of a state procedural waiver.33 Otherwise, the avail-
ability of federal review undermined state procedural requirements, such
as Florida's contemporaneous objection rule 4
Justice Rehnquist reinjected federalism and comity concerns into the
Court's habeas review of state court judgments.3 To allow easy and un-
fettered access to federal review of constitutional claims not raised at the
trial court level, he argued, "tends to detract from the perception of the
trial of a criminal case.., as a decisive and portentous event., 36 In Sykes,
the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the district court to
dismiss the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. 37  The Court held that,
27. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1977) (denying habeas relief to
respondent who failed to object to Miranda violation during the state court proceedings).
28. Id. at 75.
29. Id. at 75-77.
30. Id. at 87.
31. Id. at 87-88 (holding that "[i]t is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going far
beyond the facts of the case eliciting it, which we today reject").
32. Id. at 87 (applying the "'cause' and 'prejudice' test from Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976)).
33. Id. at 88-89.
34. Id. at 89 ("We think the rule of Fay v. Noia, broadly stated, may encourage 'sand-
bagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not
guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal
habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off.").
35. Id. at 81 ("[I]t is a well-established principle of federalism that a state decision
resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is immune from review in the
federal courts.").
36. Id. at 90.
37. Id. at 91.
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given the strong evidence of the petitioner's guilt, the admission of his
statements did not result in prejudice sufficient to pass the announced
cause and prejudice test.38
2. "Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice" Exception for Otherwise Pro-
cedurally Flawed Constitutional Claims
Despite the tendency toward a stricter application of federal habeas re-
view, the Rehnquist Court recognized that certain circumstances man-
date granting habeas review even where the prisoner does not meet the
requirement of cause and prejudice under Sykes.39 In Murray v. Carrier,
the Court upheld the Sykes rule, finding that the petitioner's claim that
his counsel inadvertently failed to raise a due process claim on appeal did
not warrant habeas relief absent a showing of cause and prejudice.4 Yet,
in her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor recognized that in rare cases,
prisoners who have been victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice
might not be able meet the required cause and prejudice showing.41 In
these isolated cases "where a constitutional violation has probably re-
sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas
court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause., 42 It
38. Id.; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (holding that, absent a show-
ing of actual prejudice, a prisoner may not raise a constitutional challenge to jury instruc-
tions in a federal habeas proceeding where he failed to comply with an Ohio rule requiring
"contemporaneous objections to jury instructions").
39. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995) (holding that the standard an-
nounced in Murray v. Carrier applies to the miscarriage of justice exception for otherwise
procedurally defaulted habeas petitions); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)
("[W]here a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a show-
ing of cause for the procedural default."); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (allowing federal habeas review of successive petitions where the pris-
oner "supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual inno-
cence"). Judge Friendly decried the fact that despite advances of the Warren Court in the
area of defendants' rights, federal habeas corpus continued to expand, especially in cases
where the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is not in doubt: "The proverbial man from
Mars['] ... astonishment would grow when we told him that the one thing almost never
suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime." Friendly,
supra note 3, at 145. Voicing concerns about finality in criminal litigation as well as con-
servation of judicial resources, Judge Friendly saw no theoretical advantage in allowing for
a "second round of attacks simply because the alleged error is a 'constitutional' one." Id.
at 155. "Today it is the rare criminal appeal that does not involve a 'constitutional' claim."
Id. at 156.
40. Murray, 477 U.S. at 494.
41. Id. at 495-96.
42. Id. at 496; cf Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346 (1992) (holding that to show
"actual innocence" a petitioner must show that absent the claimed constitutional error, "'a
rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the existence of those
facts which are prerequisites under ... law for the imposition of the death penalty"' (quot-
ing Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 1991))).
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was clear to Justice O'Connor that such cases will be rare and that gener-
ally there is nothing "fundamentally unfair" about procedural bars to
43federal habeas review.
The miscarriage of justice exception that arose for both successive peti-
tions44 and procedurally defaulted petitions45 required further elaboration
to explain what constitutes a showing of "actual innocence" sufficient to
allow federal habeas review.46 The Court in Sawyer v. Whitley applied a
clear and convincing evidence standard that, absent the constitutional
error, "no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for
the death penalty under the applicable state law."47 The Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision that the evidence
withheld from the jury did not render the petitioner ineligible for the
death penalty under Louisiana law.48 Thus, this error was insufficient to
allow a successive petition for federal habeas review.49 The "clear and
convincing" standard would soon be limited to the facts of Sawyer, where
the petitioner challenged the legitimacy of his death sentence and not his
guilt or innocence. 0
The Court in Schlup v. Delo rejected the Sawyer Court's attempt to in-
still a more exacting standard into the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception.' The issue before the Court was which standard to apply in a
miscarriage of justice analysis of Schlup's claim of innocence-a constitu-
tional challenge based on ineffective assistance of counsel and withhold-
ing of evidence by the State. 2 The petitioner's claims would otherwise be
barred from review because they were raised for the first time in his sec-
ond habeas petition. 3
43. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1986) ("We similarly reject the suggestion
that there is anything 'fundamentally unfair' about enforcing procedural default rules in
cases devoid of any substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the
guilt or sentencing determination.").
44. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 444.
45. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86.
46. See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 335 (finding a clear and convincing evidence standard
required for claims of actual innocence intended to cure procedurally flawed constitutional
claims).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 338.
49. Id.
50. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995).
51. Id. at 324.
52. Id. at 307. In his second habeas petition, Schlup alleged that: (1) he was actually
innocent; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective; and (3) the State withheld exculpatory evi-
dence. Id.
53. Id. at 314-15 ("Schlup may obtain review of his constitutional claims only if he
falls within the 'narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice."'
(quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991))).
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Justice Stevens' majority opinion found that the standard of proof in
Carrier-"that the constitutional error 'probably' resulted in the convic-
tion of one who was actually innocent"-applied in such cases.4 The
Court distinguished a claim of actual innocence from the situation in
Sawyer where the petitioner's claim was that he was "'actually innocent
of the death penalty."'55 The Court made it clear that Carrier's "probably
resulted" standard must apply to the miscarriage of justice exception
where a petitioner has received a death sentence and argues actual inno-
cence to bypass otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims.56
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Congress
Joins the Mix to Limit Federal Habeas Corpus
In response to criticisms of the lengthy appeals process for death row
inmates and the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996.17 Purporting
to advance the goals of comity, finality, and federalism,58 AEDPA insti-
tuted a variety of restrictions on the federal habeas corpus review of state
court judgments. 59 Among the adopted restrictions were provisions man-
dating a one-year statute of limitations for a writ of habeas corpus appli-
cation,60 a ban on claims in a second or successive application under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 that were present in a prior application,61 and a ban on new
claims in a second or successive application unless the new claims meet
54. Id. at 322 ("In addition to linking miscarriages of justice to innocence, Carrier and
Kuhlmann also expressed the standard of proof that should govern consideration of those
claims.").
55. Id. at 323.
56. Id. at 326-27.
57. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. AEDPA was passed in response to the wide-
spread laments regarding the post-conviction death penalty appeals process. See State-
ment on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 630, 631 (Apr. 24, 1996) (containing President Clinton's comments at the signing
of the Act: "For too long, and in too many cases, endless-death row appeals have stood in
the way of justice being served."). This legislation also seemed to address many of the
concerns voiced by Judge Friendly thirty years earlier when he advocated restrictions on
federal habeas corpus, "to prevent abuse by prisoners, a waste of the precious and limited
resources available for the criminal process, and public disrespect for the judgments of
criminal courts." Friendly, supra note 3, at 172.
5& See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (recognizing the "AEDPA's pur-
pose to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism").
59. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (2000). Section 2254(d)(1), in particular, has been
disputed regarding what constitutes a state court decision decided contrary to or unrea-
sonably applying "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395
(2000) (holding that the petitioner was entitled to relief because the Virginia Supreme
Court erred in dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
60. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
61. Id. § 2244(b)(1).
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one of two conditions.62 The Supreme Court's interpretation of AEDPA
is relevant for the purposes of this Comment to the extent that the statute
might affect both the miscarriage of justice exception and the Court's
consideration of freestanding claims of innocence. 63
AEDPA's impact on § 2244 raised questions regarding the continued
validity of the miscarriage of justice exception to otherwise barred habeas
claims.64 The Court has responded to both AEDPA restrictions and the
62. Id. § 2244(b)(2) (requiring exceptions for new claims in a second or successive
application when: (1) the claim is based on a new rule of constitutional law, or (2) the facts
underlying the claim could not have been discovered earlier "through the exercise of due
diligence," and the facts would "establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have" convicted the prisoner).
63. The area of federal habeas law dealing with successive petitions and the "doctrine
of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed
and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions," and,
except for its role in the miscarriage of justice exception, is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991).
64. See Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an "Actual Innocence" Ex-
ception to AEDPA's Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343,349-50
(2001-2002) (arguing that AEDPA's statute of limitations provision should have included
an actual innocence or miscarriage of justice exception, and if interpreted to exclude such
an exception, the statute violates the Suspension Clause). Although Sussman correctly
points out that AEDPA's statute of limitation provisions are silent on the issue of the
miscarriage of justice exception, it can be argued from subsequent cases that the exception
remains viable. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) (noting that
"[tihe miscarriage of justice standard is altogether consistent ... with AEDPA's central
concern"). Additionally, Sussman's claim that AEDPA's statute of limitations provision
offends the Suspension Clause is belied by the Court's pre- and post-AEDPA Suspension
Clause jurisprudence. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996) (holding that
AEDPA affects the standards governing the granting of habeas relief in the successive
petition context, but does not prevent the Court from entertaining an application and thus
offends neither that doctrine nor the Suspension Clause). Noting that the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 greatly expanded the breadth of federal habeas review, the Court in Felker
observed that the notion of the writ at the time the Suspension Clause was written referred
only to cases where it was necessary that the prisoner be brought into the court to testify.
Id. at 659. The Court concluded further that even if the Suspension Clause protected fed-
eral habeas corpus to its current statutory extent, the provisions of AEDPA still do not
amount to a "suspension" of the writ. Id. at 664; see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
381 (1977) (holding that the old § 2255 was not barred by the Suspension Clause). Justice
Stevens reiterated the government's position that the Suspension Clause did in fact refer to
the scope of the writ at the time of the framing and "at that time the writ was not em-
ployed in collateral attacks on judgments entered by courts of competent jurisdiction." Id.
at 380. For more discussion on AEDPA, see Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Reliti-
gation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 891-92 (1998) (demonstrating
that Congress has the absolute right to limit federal habeas corpus by way of AEDPA,
Scheidegger asks: "[Clan Congress limit the additional remedy of its own creation to the
circumstances in which it believes the benefit to be worth the cost, or is it constitutionally
forced to an all-or-nothing choice? This is a simple question with a simple, obvious an-
swer"). See generally Richard A. Posner, Foreword, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv.
31, 59-60 (2005) (espousing pragmatism and judicial modesty in the Supreme Court's con-
stitutionally-based decisions). Even where the Court could, in some-either legitimate or
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role of federal habeas review generally.65 In Calderon v. Thompson, the
Court considered whether the Ninth Circuit's decision to revoke its man-
date denying habeas relief was governed by § 2244(b).6 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that § 2244(b) did not apply because the court recalled the first
petition sua sponte, not as the result of a successive petition by the pris-67
oner. In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court announced that the peti-
tioner did not satisfy the miscarriage of justice standard of Schlup and
Sawyer.6 This suggests that the rationale underlying Schlup has survived
the stringency of AEDPA, and the miscarriage of justice exception is
alive and well.69
strained-reading of the Suspension Clause, strike down such a provision, Judge Posner
argues that from a pragmatic standpoint, it is better for the Court to affirm federal gov-
ernment action unless that action is either "inconsistent with all reasonable understand-
ings" of the constitutional provision at issue or is "revolting." Id.
65. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
66. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 554 (holding that where the court considered the first appli-
cation and not a successive one, the letter of AEDPA was not violated).
67. Id. at 548.
68. Id. at 560. In announcing that the petitioner here did not satisfy the miscarriage of
justice standard of Sawyer and Schlup, it follows that the "more likely than not" standard
for claims of actual innocence in successive or abusive petitions still applies in the face of
AEDPA:
[W]e hold the general rule to be that, where a federal court of appeals sua sponte re-
calls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus re-
lief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscar-
riage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence.
Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 559. The post-AEDPA viability of this exception and its ability to revive
otherwise flawed petitions might have led to the additional federal habeas corpus restric-
tions proposed in both chambers of Congress in 2005. See Press Release, Jon Kyl, Limiting
Endless Death Penalty Delays (July 18, 2005), available at http://kyl.senate.gov/
record.cfm?id=240769 (discussing the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, introduced in
the United States Senate by Jon Kyl). Senator Kyl cites the failure of the reforms in
AEDPA as the reason why additional restrictions on federal habeas corpus are needed,
arguing that since AEDPA, "things have gotten worse, not better. The backlog of 'habeas'
claims has actually increased, and so has the workload of prosecutors." Id. Still, Senator
Kyl claims that the changes will allow claims of "prisoners who are truly innocent-as op-
posed to simply protesting some procedural technicality ... to move forward unimpeded."
Id. As a result of the increased volume of habeas corpus petitions since the passage of
AEDPA, legislation such as the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 is "strongly sup-
port[ed]" by the National District Attorneys Association. Press Release, Nat'l Dist. Att'ys
Ass'n, The Need for Habeas Corpus Reform Is Critical to the Credibility of Our Criminal
Justice System Says the National District Attorneys Association (Nov. 11, 2005), available
at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/newsroom/pr-habeas-corpusreform.html. But see Editorial,
Stop This Bill, WASH. POST, Jul. 10, 2005, at B6 (describing the Streamlined Procedures
Act of 2005 as a "particularly ugly piece of legislation designed to gut the legal means by
which prisoners prove their innocence"); AM. BAR ASS'N, STREAMLINED PROCEDURES
ACT OF 2005 S. 1088 / H.R. 3035 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 3-7,
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsffLegislation/Habeas/$FILE/ABA analysis.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2006) (stating the ABA's opposition to the proposed legislation). The ABA ar-
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Indeed, the fact that the Court has interpreted § 2244 to include this
exception both pre- and post-AEDPA indicates the Court's tendency to
find federal habeas corpus available in the extreme case where a prisoner
has made a showing of actual innocence.7 ° This tendency came into play
in Herrera v. Collins, which is discussed in the following section."
D. Herrera v. Collins: Habeas Relief and Claims of Actual Innocence
Although the case law addressing the availability of habeas relief for
state prisoners with colorable constitutional claims was well-developed,
the Court faced a novel issue in 1993 with the case of Herrera v. Collins.72
In this pre-AEDPA case, the Court once again was charged with recon-
ciling the conflict of finality and comity with the fair administration of
gues that the provisions would eliminate federal habeas corpus for claims that the pris-
oner's procedural default was due to his ineffective assistance of counsel, eliminate federal
habeas corpus in cases where the state court has determined that the constitutional error
was "harmless or not prejudicial," and eliminate federal habeas corpus in death penalty
cases where the state had provided competent counsel in state post-conviction proceed-
ings). Id.
70. Although AEDPA provided no express provision to address the actual innocence
or miscarriage of justice exception specifically, the Court has implied that the exception
remains intact: "The miscarriage of justice standard is altogether consistent, however, with
AEDPA's central concern that the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revis-
ited in the absence of a strong showing of actual innocence." Calderon, 523 U.S. at 558. In
fact, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion in Schlup, the Court appeared to
ignore the plain language of the pre-AEDPA § 2244 in crafting the miscarriage of justice
exception in the first place:
Today, however, the Court obliquely but unmistakably pronounces that a successive
or abusive petition must be entertained and may not be dismissed so long as the peti-
tioner makes a sufficiently persuasive showing that a "fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice" has occurred. That conclusion flatly contradicts the statute, and is not required
by our precedent.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 344 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Justice Scalia finds this departure from clear and unambiguous statutory language inexcus-
able: "There is... no route of escape from the Court's duty to confront the statute today."
Id. at 350. One overarching characteristic of the Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence
has been allowing review in the exceptional case even when it might conflict with the ap-
parent congressional restrictions of AEDPA. See, e.g., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, supra note 3, at 942. Lamenting the Court's expansive decision in Brown v.
Allen, the report notes:
Notwithstanding the unequivocal language of the provision of section 2254(c) and
Judge Parker's observations concerning its meaning, the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Allen refused to give it effect and held that exhaustion does not require repetitive re-
course to state remedies. In reaching this result, the Court stated that it was unwilling
to accept so radical a change from prior habeas practice without "a definite congres-
sional direction."
Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
72. Id.
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criminal justice in the state courts." The petitioner argued that the newly
discovered evidence of his actual innocence was sufficient to invoke fed-
74
eral habeas corpus.
1. State Prisoner's Claim of Actual Innocence Based on Newly Discov-
ered Evidence is Not Grounds for Federal Habeas Corpus
In Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the majority opinion:
"Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to pro-
vide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual inno-
cence." 75 The petitioner Herrera filed a second federal habeas petition• • 76
ten years after his conviction. Herrera alleged in the petition that he
was actually innocent of the murders for which he was sentenced to
death, and he put forth affidavits stating that his now-dead brother had
77
committed the crimes.
The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision to vacate the stay of
execution, holding that the claim of actual innocence was not proper:
"'[T]he existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the
guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas cor-
pus.'" '78 The Court held the petition here did not state a claim for federal
habeas relief because Herrera did not allege an independent constitu-
tional violation in the state proceedings. 9
The Chief Justice also made it a point to distinguish the situation in
Herrera from the fundamental miscarriage of justice cases. ° Despite the
petitioner's argument that the execution of a factually innocent person is
a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court made it
clear that a claim of "actual innocence" is not an independent constitu-
tional claim." Rather, it provides the otherwise flawed habeas petitioner
82
with a "gateway" to federal court review.
Despite the apparently unequivocal stance the majority took in
Herrera, the Court left open the question of when, if ever, the incarcera-
tion or execution of a factually innocent person violates the United States
73. See id. at 398. Ten years after his conviction, Herrera brought his actual inno-
cence claim in a second federal habeas petition. Id.
74. Id. Petitioner Herrera claimed that he was actually innocent and thus his death
sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
75. Id. at 401.
76. Id. at 393.
77. Id. at 396-97.
78. Id. at 398 (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,317 (1963)).
79. Id. at 400.
80. Id. at 404 ("Petitioner in this case is simply not entitled to habeas relief based on
the reasoning of this line of cases.").
81. Id. at 404-05.
82. Id. at 404.
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83Constitution. Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared, in dicta, to craft an
exception to the general rule that actual innocence claims do not warrant
freestanding habeas relief.84 The Chief Justice assumed for the sake of
argument that "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'
would demand a different result.85 Justice White's concurring opinion
further bolstered the presence of such an exception.86 He asserted the
very same proposition, "that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence'
made after trial, even though made after the expiration of the time pro-
vided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence, would
render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case.
87
Though the Court is divided over the issue of whether the incarceration
of an actually innocent person offends the Constitution, at least a plural-
ity of judges seem to hold that the execution of a truly innocent person is
unconstitutional. 8 The question that remained unanswered is what stan-
dard is required to meet this apparent exception as announced in
Herrera.89  Following the Court's recent decision in House v. Bell this
question remains unanswered.9°
83. Id. at 407-08 & n.6. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not address the question of
whether due process prohibits the execution of an actually innocent person because, in his
analysis, Herrera came before the Court as a person convicted under the protections pro-
vided by the due process of law-his claim could only be considered to be a procedural due
process claim. Id.
84. Id. at 417 ("We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in
a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional ... .
85. Id.
86. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring). Justice White wrote that to be eligible under
this exception, the petitioner must show that based on his "newly discovered evidence and
the entire record before the jury that convicted him, 'no rational trier of fact could [find]
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
87. Id.
88. Compare id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("There is no basis in text, tradition,
or even in contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a
right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought
forward after conviction."), with id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I believe it contrary
to any standard of decency to execute someone who is actually innocent. Because the
Eighth Amendment applies to questions of guilt or innocence ... I also believe that peti-
tioner may raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to his punishment on the ground that he
is actually innocent.... Execution of the innocent is equally offensive to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
89. Id. at 417 (majority opinion) (stating only that standard must be "extraordinarily
high").
90. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086-87 (2006). The majority declined to answer
the question regarding the viability of Herrera claims of actual innocence: "House urges
the Court to answer the question left open in Herrera and hold not only that freestanding
innocence claims are possible but also that he has established one. We decline to resolve
this issue." Id.
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2. House v. Bell: The Sixth Circuit Addresses a Claim of Innocence
The question of what constitutes a showing of innocence sufficient to
warrant habeas relief that would otherwise be barred came before the
Sixth Circuit in the case of House v. Bell.9' In House, a Tennessee jury
convicted petitioner Paul G. House for the murder of Mrs. Carolyn
Muncey." House filed a habeas petition raising "actual innocence" under
the miscarriage of justice exception to cure an otherwise procedurally
defaulted claim.93 His argument relied on the rationale in Schlup, that to
prevail on this exception "'the petitioner must show that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of
the new evidence."'' ' The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, applied this stan-
dard to newly discovered evidence that House presented in district court,
and ultimately affirmed the district court's denial of federal habeas cor-
95
pus.
The Sixth Circuit voted eight-to-seven to affirm, a close vote making
the case an excellent vehicle to test the Supreme Court's standard for
federal habeas review. 6 Indeed, Circuit Judge Merritt noted in his dis-
sent that this is "the rare or extraordinary case in which the petitioner
through newly discovered evidence has established his actual innocence
of both the death sentence and underlying homicide." 97
House had presented a variety of new evidence in district court, includ-
ing DNA evidence proving that semen found on the victim's nightgown,
and originally attributed to him at trial, in fact belonged to Mrs. Muncey's
91. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 677 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (affirming the district
court's finding that the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were proce-
durally defaulted), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006).
92. Id. at 668. Though the evidence against House was characterized as circumstan-
tial, "it was quite strong. Particularly incriminating was the testimony that he had emerged
from an embankment where the body was found, wiping his hands on a dark cloth, without
disclosing to anyone the presence of the body." Id. at 673.
93. Id. at 677.
94. Id. at 678 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). "Claims of actual
innocence pose less of a threat to scarce judicial resources and to principles of finality and
comity than do claims that focus solely on the erroneous imposition of the death penalty."
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
95. House, 386 F.3d at 685 ("Despite his best efforts, the case against House remains
strong.... [H]e has fallen short of showing, as he must, that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.").
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006) (No. 04-
8990), available at 2005 WL 1527632 (presenting two questions for the Supreme Court: (1)
"Did the majority below err in applying this Court's decision in Schlup v. Delo to hold that
Petitioner's compelling new evidence ... was as a matter of law insufficient to excuse his
failure to present that evidence before the state courts"; and (2) "[w]hat constitutes a 'truly
persuasive showing of actual innocence' pursuant to Herrera v. Collins sufficient to war-
rant freestanding habeas relief").
97. House, 386 F.3d at 686 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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husband.9' Despite this evidence, a majority of the Sixth Circuit denied
federal habeas review.99 Mr. House petitioned for, and the Supreme
Court granted, certiorari.' ° In his petition for certiorari, House argued
that his newly discovered evidence satisfied both the Schlup gateway
standard and the Herrera freestanding claim of actual innocence stan-
dard 11
3. The Roberts Court Rules on a Claim of Innocence
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy announced that
House had in fact satisfied the "stringent showing" required by the mis-
carriage of justice exception.'O° Therefore, the Court held that House's
habeas action may continue in federal court despite the state procedural
bar. 03 Justice Kennedy restated the governing standard as requiring a
showing that "in light of the new evidence, . . . more likely than not any
reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt."1°4
Although neither the district court nor the Sixth Circuit was persuaded
by House's newly presented evidence, the Court stressed three particular
aspects of House's case that warranted reversal.05 Justice Kennedy dis-
cussed in great detail the importance of the DNA evidence,' °6 the blood-
stain testimony,' ° and the testimony that Mrs. Muncey's husband may
have confessed to the horrific crime. 10 8 Though House was not charged
with a sexual offense, the majority relied upon DNA testing showing that
the source of the semen on Mrs. Muncey's nightgown was her husband
and not House.'9 Because the Court determined that the prosecution
alluded to a sexual motive in its closing arguments, evidence that the se-
men stain did not come from House would impact a reasonable juror's
decision.1 Justice Kennedy also gave weight to House's theory that the
victim's blood was spilled onto House's jeans before the evidence arrived
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory for analysis."' Taken
together, the Court found House's newly presented evidence to be sig-
98. Id.
99. Id. (majority opinion).
100. House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005).
101. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at *31, *33.
102. House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064,2068 (2006).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2077. Justice Kennedy restated the Schiup standard without the "double
negative." Id.
105. See id. at 2083.
106. Id. at 2078-79.
107. Id. at 2079-81.
108. Id. at 2083-84.
109. Id. at 2078-79.
110. Id. at 2079.
111. Id. at 2080-81.
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nificant enough that no reasonable juror would have convicted House in
light of this evidence.'
12
Justice Kennedy's opinion conceded that even with the newly discov-
ered evidence, there was significant and undisputed circumstantial evi-
dence against House, writing: "This is not a case of conclusive exonera-
tion.""1 3 Based on that finding, the Court held that although House had
cast doubt on his guilt with his introduction of the newly discovered evi-
dence, he did not satisfy the Herrera standard, if such a claim even exists,
for freestanding claims of actual innocence. Thus, the Court did not see
fit to determine "whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence
claim would require."'1 5 Justice Kennedy made clear that in considering
evidence under a Schlup claim, the Supreme Court would not have to
rely on the district court's evidentiary findings.
116
Chief Justice Roberts penned the dissent in this case., joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas (Justice Alito took no part in the consideration of the
case)." The newly confirmed Chief Justice took the majority to task for
disregarding the district court's findings: "Witnesses do not testify in our
courtroom, and it is not our role to make credibility findings and con-
struct theories .... We are to defer to the better situated District Court
on reliability, unless we determine that its findings are clearly errone-
ous."11 8 Given that the district court had already poured over the evi-
dence and heard the testimony, the dissenters saw no reason to "second-
guess" the district court's findings. 9
Chief Justice Roberts considered the newly presented evidence with an
emphasis on the district court's credibility findings.' 20 Though the DNA
112. Id. at 2083. The majority emphasizes the strength of the new evidence when taken
as a whole:
Were House's challenge to the State's case limited to the questions he has raised
about the blood and semen, the other evidence favoring the prosecution might well
suffice to bar relief. There is, however, more; for in the post-trial proceedings House
presented troubling evidence that Mr. Muncey, the victim's husband, himself could
have been the murderer.
Id.
113. Id. at 2086.
114. Id. at 2087.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2078. The majority clearly doubted the evidentiary and credibility determi-
nations made by the district court to the extent that Justice Kennedy wrote that the major-
ity was "uncertain" about the reliability of its conclusions. Id.
117. Id. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). The dissenting
faction concurred as to the rejection of the Herrera claim. Id.
118. Id. at 2090.
119. Id. at 2092.
120. Id. Chief Justice Roberts described the district court's determination with much
deference: "The District Court attentively presided . . . concisely summarized ... then
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evidence might have eliminated the possibility of a sexual motive, he
noted that the other two pieces of evidence relied upon by the majority
were judged by the district court as lacking in credibility. 12' The Chief
Justice applied the Schiup standard and concluded that, while the DNA
evidence might cloud the motive issue in the minds of one or more jurors,
it is "more likely than not that in light of this new evidence, at least one
juror, acting reasonably, would vote to convict House."'2  Because of this
likelihood, the dissent, stressing the "important judicial interests of final-
ity and comity,"'23 would have affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision.'
24
Given the Justices' differing opinions on what standard to apply to-and
what, if any, chance exists for-petitioners with freestanding claims of in-
nocence, Part II of this Comment addresses the efficacy of the current
habeas jurisprudence given the influx of claims of innocence due to ad-
vances in DNA-testing technologies.
II. FEDERALISM, FINALITY, AND THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE
A. Widespread Calls for Freestanding Habeas Review
The attention given to high profile DNA-based exonerations has
spurred many legal commentators and practicing attorneys to call for a
variety of federal habeas reforms.'2' These proposed remedies range
from the favorable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent in Herrera
dutifully made findings about the reliability of the testimony it heard and the evidence it
observed." Id.
121. See id. at 2095-96.
122. Id. at 2096.
123. Id. at 2089.
124. Id. at 2087.
125. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two
Legislative Proposals for Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 320 (1990-1991) (proposing that the federal
habeas statute be amended to allow state prisoners in capital cases to allege that based on
new evidence of innocence, "there is now probable cause to believe that a new jury might
reach a different outcome on either guilt or sentence"); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics
of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 773-74 (2002) (proposing several remedies to the limitations on the
filing of successive petitions put in effect by AEDPA); Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a
Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 122
(2005) (comparing the Court's decision in Herrera to such infamous decisions as Kore-
matsu and Plessy: "The Herrera Court turned a blind eye to the execution of innocent
people"); Rachel E. Wheeler, Note, AEDPA Deference and the Undeveloped State Factual
Record: Monroe v. Angelone and New Evidence, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1890
(2005) (arguing that federal courts should review de novo all presentations of evidence not
considered by the state court).
[Vol. 56:227
Handling Claims of Actual Innocence
and Schlup proposed by Mr. House,26 to more significant departures.
These pleas run headlong into the strong view of federalism espoused by
the Court's recent collateral attack jurisprudence.'2 This conflict raises
the question of whether the federal district court system is the most effec-
tive venue to re-litigate state court judgments when a prisoner raises a
claim of actual innocence.'29 Given the broad discretionary powers allot-
ted to the states to enforce their criminal laws, state-based remedies ap-
pear to be a more appropriate solution.
1. Is It Judicious for Federal District Courts to Re-litigate State Court
Judgments?
In support of their position, opponents of the exercise of federal habeas
review in cases lacking constitutional violations cite respect for state
court judgments, finality, and the inherent unreliability of factual deter-
minations made years after a crime has been committed. 30 The power
granted to the federal courts to intervene in state court proceedings
should only be used if there is a violation of "clearly established federal
law.'' Former Chief Justice Rehnquist has emphasized that prisoners,
126. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at *31-33 (arguing that Herrera
allows for habeas review when the petitioner demonstrated a truly persuasive claim of
innocence).
127. See Stevenson, supra note 125, at 774, 783-84 (proposing congressional reform and
a broader interpretation of federal habeas corpus).
128. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) ("Few rulings would be more disrup-
tive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims
of actual innocence.").
129. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 507-14 (1963).
130. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403 ("[T]he passage of time only diminishes the reliability
of criminal adjudications."). In Herrera, the habeas petition was filed ten years after the
petitioner's conviction, making more difficult the district court's effort to weigh "'hot' and
'cold' evidence on petitioner's guilt or innocence." Id. at 404; see also Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing the problems that the State
might encounter in attempting to retry criminal cases years after witnesses have disap-
peared and memories have faded); Bator, supra note 129, at 443-44 (arguing that habeas
corpus jurisdiction should be used to review state courts' decisional processes and not the
guilt or innocence results of state criminal proceedings). Professor Bator points to the
impulse inherent in many lawyers and judges "to make doubly, triply, even ultimately sure
that the particular judgment is just" as detrimental to finality in criminal prosecutions. Id.
at 443.
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000) (stating, in relevant part, that an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner convicted in state court proceedings will not
be granted unless the decision "involved an unreasonable application of... clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" or "based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts"); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004)
(holding that "clearly established [federal] law" refers to Supreme Court holdings in force
at "'the time of the relevant state court decision' (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 472 (2000))); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (holding that "a state court's
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like Herrera, were duly convicted in front of a jury under all the protec-
tions of the Constitution.132 In his view, nothing short of a "truly persua-
sive" showing of innocence would warrant a federal remedy.
133
Proponents of a broader exercise of federal habeas review counter
these arguments with several recurrent themes. The first counterargu-
ment can be described as the "fundamental fairness" argument.'3 This
school of thought relies on the proposition that no matter which constitu-
tional right is at issue, it is fundamentally offensive to the Constitution to
deny federal relief to a state prisoner with a claim of actual innocence.
Justices Brennan and Stevens advocated this position in their opposition
to many of the Rehnquist Court's habeas corpus decisions. 3 Presently,
decision is not 'contrary to... clearly established Federal law' simply because the court did
not cite our opinions"). For an extensive statutory analysis of § 2254(d)(1), see Allan Ides,
Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory
Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 677, 682-84 (2003) (interpret-
ing the "clearly established federal law" requirement to mean that the federal law must be
"embodied in a pre-existing Supreme Court precedent" to allow for habeas review). Pro-
fessor Ides posits that to qualify under the "contrary to" requirement of § 2254(d)(1), the
state court judgment must have applied "a legal standard other than the one dictated by
that [Supreme Court] precedent and, as a consequence, arrives at an outcome incompati-
ble with that precedent." Id. at 687; see also Melissa M. Barry, Seeking Clarity in the Fed-
eral Habeas Fog: Determining What Constitutes "Clearly Established" Law Under The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 747, 754-55 (2005)
(proposing five analytical touchstones to guide the Court's determination of when a prece-
dent amounts to "clearly established law" under the Act).
132. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 418-19.
133. Id. at 417.
134. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) ("The writ of habeas corpus
indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence.... Today, as in prior centu-
ries, the writ is a bulwark against convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness."' (quoting
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring))); Eric Seinsheimer,
Note, Dretke v. Haley and the Still Unknown Limits of the Actual Innocence Exception, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 905, 907 (2005) ("The Court's decision [in Dretke v. Haley] is
also fundamentally unfair, because it punishes Haley for a triad of mistakes by others: his
counsel during trial, the district court, and the Fifth Circuit.").
135. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 516 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
root principle underlying 28 U.S.C. §2254 is that government in a civilized society must
always be accountable for an individual's imprisonment; if the imprisonment does not
conform to the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immedi-
ate release.").
136. See, e.g., id. at 500 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("As the statute suggests, the central
mission of the Great Writ should be the substance of 'justice,' not the form of proce-
dures."). Justice Brennan argued that the plurality in Kuhlmann was not faithful to history
and prior interpretation of habeas corpus:
Having thus implied that factual innocence is central to our habeas jurisprudence
generally, the plurality declares that it is fundamental to the proper interpretation of
"the ends of justice." Neither the plurality's standard for consideration of successive
petitions nor its theory of habeas corpus is supported by statutory language, legisla-
tive history, or our precedents.
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legal observers and scholars cite a multitude of cases in which prisoners
and death row inmates have been exonerated to support this view of ha-
137beas corpus.
The second argument against the current state of habeas corpus is that
the Rehnquist Court's attempts to limit review have proved detrimental
to finality, federalism, and judicial economy. By carving out various pro-
cedural tests for when a state prisoner may qualify under § 2254, Profes-
sor Barry Friedman argues that the Court has effectively undermined the
statute's stated purpose.138  Friedman evaluates the Rehnquist Court's
concerns for finality, federalism, and judicial economy, and posits that "it
is time for the Supreme Court to ask itself whether the reform venture
has been a success."'3 9 Citing the fact that the Court already reviews state
court judgments under the miscarriage of justice analysis for otherwise
procedurally defaulted claims, Friedman makes the case that the current
state of habeas jurisprudence fails to address the Court's fears.4°
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 462-63 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see
Friendly, supra note 3, at 170-71. Judge Friendly, arguing against the view of the majority
Court in Fay v. Noia, vehemently denies Justice Brennan's characterization of the original
understanding of the writ:
[D]espite the "prodigious research" evidenced by the Noia opinion, the assertion that
habeas as known at common law permitted going behind a conviction by a court of
general jurisdiction is simply wrong. The very historians cited in the opinion disagree
with any such conclusion. Bushell's Case, the only authority cited that gives even
slight support to the thesis espoused in the elaborate dictum, is wholly inadequate to
sustain the view that English courts used the writ to penetrate convictions of felony
and treason and seek out violations of Magna Carta.
Id. at 171 (footnotes omitted).
137. See Brief for the Innocence Project, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 1-2, House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006) (No. 04-8990) (describing a "revolution" of
DNA-based exonerations since the Court decided Schlup).
138. Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 485,488 (1995).
139. Id. at 546.
140. Id. at 500-01. Minimizing the judicial economy argument, Friedman writes that
"[t]he number of habeas petitions actually granted by the federal courts is small anyway,
and evidence suggests that the number has not dropped appreciably under the reform
effort." Id. at 501 (footnote omitted). Friedman asserts that the very nature of the Court's
view of habeas corpus violates federalist principles:
Superficially the most serious-seeming injury is the very fact that federal courts will
adjudicate claims of guilt and innocence. This displaces the state courts from their
very raison d'etre. But there is another injury to federalism here, an injury of the very
sort one would think the Rehnquist Court would most disdain. That is the implicit
aspect of Herrera, the "if they don't do it we will do it for them" conclusion that the
federal courts may only hear innocence claims if state process is unavailable. This ap-
pears to wipe away state limitations on the time for presenting newly discovered evi-
dence, at least if state courts want to avoid the risk of federal courts throwing egg all
over their faces.
Id. at 512 (footnote omitted).
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Perhaps the widespread criticism from the legal community, coupled
with circuit court difficulties in applying Supreme Court habeas prece-
dents, led the Court to grant certiorari in House v. Bell.1 4 In practice, the
circuits have interpreted the freestanding Herrera actual innocence claims
in a variety of ways, including that they exist but require an extraordinaryS • 142 143
showing, that they exist but are restricted to capital cases, that they
exist but only where there is no state post-conviction avenue available,'"
or that they do not exist at all. 145 Because the Supreme Court in House
141. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at *31-33 & n.18 (detailing a
variety of standards the various circuits have imposed to deal with the Court's decision in
Herrera).
142. See, e.g., Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a free-
standing actual innocence basis for habeas relief although the petitioner "must affirma-
tively prove that he is probably innocent"), amended, 421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005); Cox v.
Burger, 398 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining the difference between Herrera
and Schlup claims of actual innocence, and recognizing that the petitioner is entitled to
habeas review where he has alleged a "'truly persuasive demonstration[] of actual inno-
cence" (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 426 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring))),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 93 (2005); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 596 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding that the Court in Herrera distinguished between substantive and procedural claims
of actual innocence; and for substantive claims, the petitioner must "demonstrate that 'no
rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"' (alteration in
original) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring))); House v. Bell, 386
F.3d 668, 688-90, 708 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (applying Justice
White's framework for freestanding actual innocence claims), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006);
Conley v. United States, 323 F.3d 7, 14 n.6 (1st Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating "[i]t is not
clear whether a habeas claim could be based on new evidence proving actual innocence");
David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347-48 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that an actual innocence
exception "has been firmly disallowed by the Supreme Court as an independent ground of
habeas relief, save (possibly) in extraordinary circumstances in a capital case").
143. See, e.g., Pettit v. Addison, 150 F. App'x 923, 926 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that
freestanding relief under the Herrera standard is not available where petitioner was not
sentenced to death); Lodge v. Candelaria, 107 F. App'x 110, 111 (9th Cir. 2004) (mem.)
("A freestanding claim of actual innocence does not, absent an independent constitutional
violation in the criminal proceeding, state a ground for federal habeas relief in a non-
capital case."), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 983 (2005); Hunt v. McDade, 205 F.3d 1333, 2000 WL
219755, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (clarifying the Herrera
holding: "analytical assumptions recognizing the possibility of a persuasive freestanding
claim of actual innocence may be limited to capital cases because those assumptions were
made in the context of evaluating the constitutionality of the petitioner's execution").
144. See, e.g., Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (interpreting Herrera to
mean that actual innocence alone will not avail a prisoner of federal habeas review if the
state in which he is incarcerated offers the option of executive clemency); Felker v. Turpin,
83 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the Herrera standard to require that a
petitioner establish persuasively (1) that there are no state post-conviction avenues to
pursue, and (2) that he is innocent).
145. See, e.g., Balsewicz v. Kingston, 425 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit allows freestanding actual innocence
claims when the petitioner's filing is untimely), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1160 (2006); Fielder
v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2004) ("It has long been recognized that '[c]laims of
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence' are never grounds for 'federal ha-
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failed to answer the questions surrounding Herrera claims,' 46 state prison-
ers with claims of actual innocence based wholly, or in part, on DNA
evidence are likely to persist. 147 As a result, competing political and judi-
beas relief absent an independent constitutional violation."' (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at
400)), cert. denied sub nom. Fielder v. Lavan, 543 U.S. 1067 (2005); Kincy v. Dretke, 92 F.
App'x 87, 92 (5th Cir. 2004) (announcing that "it has long been the rule in this circuit that
claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence alone are not cognizable
under federal habeas corpus"); United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 69 (2d Cir. 2002)
(stating that "the Supreme Court established in Herrera that there is no fundamental right
to the opportunity for exoneration even before one's execution date, much less during the
entire course of one's natural lifetime").
146. Supreme Court observers and political commentators have speculated on the
likely jurisprudential approach of Chief Justice John Roberts. E.g., Editorial, Roberts's
Conservative Leanings, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at A16 (discussing the question of
whether Roberts' jurisprudence would track that of the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, for whom Roberts clerked); Editorial, Young Lawyer Roberts, WASH. POST,
Jul. 31, 2005, at B6 (discussing Roberts' role in the Justice Department during the Reagan
administration as showing "a lawyer fully in tune with the staunchly conservative legal
views of the administration he was serving"). Those who anticipate a "conservative" Jus-
tice Roberts point to, among other things, his 1981 memorandum regarding federal habeas
reform efforts in which he criticized the status of federal habeas corpus at that time as
"'making a mockery of the entire criminal justice system."' Roberts's Conservative Lean-
ings, supra.
To the extent that such observers might have correctly predicted Chief Justice Roberts's
approach to federal habeas corpus, the same predictions have been made with respect to
Associate Justice Samuel Alito, Jr., who did not take part in the House case. House v.
Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2006). Evidence of Justice Alito's textualist approach can be
seen in his critique of the Court's decision in Fisher v. United States, which altered the
Court's analysis regarding the Fifth Amendment and the compulsory process of docu-
ments: "The lack of proof that the fifth amendment privilege was intended to regulate
subpoenas for existing documents should end the inquiry. This problem should be left for
regulation, at the federal and state levels, by nonconstitutional means." Samuel A. Alito,
Jr., Documents and The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PIr. L. REV. 27, 80
(1986) (emphasis added).
Although conventional wisdom assumes that Justice Alito will be a "conservative"
Supreme Court Justice, such labels are hardly predictive of how a given judge would rule
on the more mundane and less politically polarizing issues. See Linda Greenhouse, Death
Penalty Case Gives a Clue to Alito's Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A16 (discuss-
ing then-Judge Alito's opinion in a federal habeas corpus case, Bronshtein v. Horn, and
concluding that "even while adhering to a straightforward and technical approach to decid-
ing the case, [Judge Alito] reached results that defy easy categorization"); see also Bron-
shtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court's order for a new
trial on guilt, and affirming the district court's order for re-sentencing), cert. denied sub
nom. Beard v. Bronshtein, 126 S. Ct. 1320 (2006). In Bronshtein, the Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding that where the prosecutor argued the future dangerous-
ness of the defendant in his closing argument, the trial judge should have instructed the
jury that the defendant would receive life without parole if they elected not to sentence
him to death. Id. at 716-20.
147. But see NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS xvii (1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/177626.pdf (predicting that over time, post-conviction
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cial philosophies must be put aside to determine the best means toevalu-
ate the merits of such claims.
2. Allegedly Exculpatory DNA Evidence: The Shining Light of Inno-
cence, or Just More Fog?
The utility of forensic DNA technology as an effective law enforcement
tool has been demonstrated time and time again.'48 Unlike many other
techniques developed for criminal investigation, DNA testing is just as
able to shed light on a given suspect's innocence as his guilt.'49 Exploiting
state-of-the-art advances in biochemistry and molecular biology, scien-
tists continue to develop new and more discriminating testing methods
more than a decade after the technology became commonplace.5 The
forward march of technology gives a new meaning to newly discovered
evidence.
In his claim for habeas relief, the petitioner in House cited, among
other things, exculpatory DNA evidence. 5' During the trial, the State
introduced serological evidence that, according to the State's expert,
could not exclude House as the source of semen stains on the victim's
clothes. 5 2 DNA technology, not available at the time of his trial, had
since shown the victim's husband to be the source of the semen stains.'53
While the petitioner offered this "new" evidence in his actual innocence
claim, the presence of the victim's spouse's DNA on her nightgown was,
in and of itself, by no means exculpatory.
This evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the State's theory of
the case.m The State hinted at House's motive-that he had attempted to
have forcible sex with Mrs. Muncey and when she fought back, he struck
claims of innocence based on DNA evidence will diminish as more sensitive testing meth-
ods are used routinely in investigating and prosecuting crimes).
148. See Edward K. Cheng, Reenvisioning Law through the DNA Lens, 60 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 649, 649 (2005) (citing the utility of DNA testing for both prosecutors
and defendants).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Robin Lloyd, Lab on a Chip May Turn Police into DNA Detectives,
WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1999, at A9 (detailing new chip technology that would allow DNA
analysis to be conducted rapidly at the actual crime scene); Lutz Roewer, Male DNA Fin-
gerprints Say More, PROFILES IN DNA, Sept. 2004, at 14, 14, available at
http://www.promega.com/profdes/702/ProfilesinDNA 702-14.pdf (describing the ability of
newly developed Y-STR technology to discriminate between male and female sources of
DNA, as well as relatedness between males).
151. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 680 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2064
(2006).
152. Id. at 672.
153. Id. at 685.
154. See House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2095-96 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting in
part, concurring in part).
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and killed her."' In fact, the lack of semen from House would support
the thwarted sexual assault theory as much as the alleged presence of his
semen might have at the trial. Likewise, the presence of Mr. Muncey's
semen on his wife's nightgown does not imply that he murdered her.
The development of new DNA testing methodologies is a double-
edged sword. Although in many cases it is highly relevant to guilt or in-
nocence, in cases like House, the test results can be consistent with both
parties' theories of the case.16 The Herrera majority's concerns regarding
diminished finality of state convictions, criticized by Friedman and oth-
ers, might come to fruition if the Court expands the reach of federal ha-
beas review.57 Any given item of evidence could be tested in the future
with different or more sensitive DNA tests.' In some cases, the results
of the subsequent rounds of testing might provide more or different in-
formation when compared to the initial results.5 9 For instance, more
sensitive tests could reveal the presence of multiple DNA contributors
where initially only one source of DNA was identified.'9 Does this
"newly discovered evidence" rise to a showing of actual innocence, or
merely a colorable claim?
155. Id. at 2095.
156. Although House presented a variety of evidence at the district court evidentiary
hearing, the semen stain exclusion was an important part of his innocence claim. House,
386 F.3d at 686 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Still, the majority opinion noted that despite of all
this, the evidence against House was "quite strong." Id. at 673 (majority opinion); cf. ED-
WARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL 28 (1996), available at http://www.denverda.org/legalResource/Exonerated
%20by%20Science.pdf (noting, for example, that DNA evidence loses much of its exculpa-
tory value in multiple defendant cases).
157. See, for example, Justice Powell's concerns: "'I know of no other system of justice
structured in a way that assures no end to the litigation of a criminal conviction. Our prac-
tice in this respect is viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries. Nor
does the Constitution require this sort of redundancy."' Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, supra note 3, at 911 (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Address Before the ABA
Division of Judicial Administration (Aug. 9, 1982)).
158. The amount of biological sample necessary for DNA testing has drastically re-
duced since RFLP-based methods first rose to prominence. See KREEGER & WEISS, supra
note 5, at 7-9 (2003); Kim Herd et al., Am. Prosecutors Research Inst., A Short Primer on
STRs: Why Do Prosecutors Need to Learn about STRs?, SILENT WITNESS, 1999, available
at http://www.ndaa.org/apri/programs/dna/newsletter.html (discussing the advantages of
STR testing as more discriminating and better for smaller samples).
159. With more sensitivity comes the chance of picking up more DNA contributors-
minute contributions that might not have been revealed with less discriminating testing
methods. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 147, at 21 (dis-
cussing categories of potential results from post-conviction DNA tests ranging from defini-
tive exclusions and inclusions to more ambiguous results); see also Carll Ladd et al., Inter-
pretation of Complex Forensic DNA Mixtures, 42 CROAT. MED. J. 244, 244-45 (2001) (ad-
dressing some of the interpretive problems associated with mixed DNA profiles).
160. See supra notes 158-59.
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B. Other Options to Address State Prisoners' Claims of Actual Innocence
1. Executive Clemency
When a state prisoner claims actual innocence, the power of a state
governor to grant clemency to state prisoners has been cited as an appro-
priate alternative to federal habeas corpus.16 ' However, the effectiveness
of executive clemency as a safeguard to protect the innocent has been
called into question, especially in death penalty-friendly states. 162 From a
historical standpoint, governors have appeared reluctant to use clemency
since the death penalty was effectively reinstated with the Supreme
Court's 1976 decision in Gregg v. Georgia.63 Professor Hugo Adam Be-
dau cites public support for the death penalty and governors' political
concerns as contributing to this reduction in the use of clemency'
Despite Bedau's cited statistical decrease in the prevalence of executive
clemency compared to other periods of our history, state governors do
intervene in capital cases. Former Virginia Governor Mark Warner,
who pardoned Marvin Lamont Anderson as a result of DNA evidence,'6
is just one example.'67 Indeed, when DNA testing might confirm the guilt
of a death row inmate or one who has already been executed, state execu-
161. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416-17 (1993) (proposing clemency as a more
suitable alternative). As the majority points out, "[h]istory shows that the traditional rem-
edy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a
new trial motion, has been executive clemency." Id. at 417.
162. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 510-11. Anderson notes that when then Texas
Governor George W. Bush commuted Henry Lee Lucas' death sentence in 1998, it was
apparently the first time a Texas governor intervened to commute a death sentence on his
own (i.e., without court intervention) since the 1930s. Id. at 511 n.206. Anderson argues
that Herrera does not allow for federal habeas relief based on freestanding claims of actual
innocence and encourages the various states to develop the means to address the problem.
Id. at 518-19. For a discussion of state legislative remedies, see infra notes 192-94.
163. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); see also Hugo Adam Bedau, The
Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255,
264 (1990-1991) (citing Department of Justice statistics showing that from 1961 to 1970
there was approximately one death sentence commuted for every 6.3 imposed, while from
1979 to 1988 the ratio dropped to one commutation per approximately every 40.2 death
sentences imposed).
164. Bedau, supra note 163, at 267-68. Bedau goes on to argue that faith in the number
of appeals in the state and federal courts give governors the security not to grant clemency.
Id. at 269.
165. See Maria Glod, Cleared Va. Man to be Pardoned: Warner's Act to End Struggle of
Trucker Cleared by DNA Evidence, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at B2 (detailing Virginia
Governor Mark Warner's pardon of Marvin Lamont Anderson, who was the first Virgin-
ian exonerated under a 2001 law allowing DNA testing of inmates).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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tive intervention is an equally important tool to consider.' 6 Virginia exe-
cuted Roger Keith Coleman in 1992 for the rape and murder of his sister-
in-law, Wanda McCoy. 169 Despite proclamations of his innocence and a
"25-year crusade" on his behalf, DNA test results, again ordered by Gov-
ernor Mark Warner, confirmed his guilt in 2006.17°
Contrary to common perception, one of the few statistical analyses on
the use of clemency found that politics do not significantly affect a state
executive's use of clemency.171 The study's author discovered that politi-
cal factors did not affect the use of executive clemency in a statistically
significant way: "Consistent with the other political factors, none of the
governors' background variables achieved statistical significance. Inter-
estingly, despite widespread popular perceptions that women, Democ-
rats, and Catholics view the death penalty with less favor, the results indi-
cate that these characteristics had no effect on clemency decisions. 17
Indeed, the outgoing Republican governor of Maryland has, since 2003,
pardoned or granted clemency to 190 convicted offenders.
Another prominent recent use of executive clemency was Illinois Gov-
ernor George H. Ryan's 2000 moratorium on executions prompted by the
174
release from of thirteen men death row in approximately ten years.
The thirteen death row pardons ranged from cases where there was scant
evidence of the inmates' guilt to cases where subsequent investigation,
including post-conviction DNA testing, excluded the inmate as a likely
168. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2533 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing the Virginia case of Roger Keith Coleman). Justice Scalia argues that while "[tihe
dissent makes much of the new-found capacity of DNA testing to establish innocence....
in every case of an executed defendant of which I am aware, that technology has confirmed
guilt." Id.
169. Glenn Frankel, Burden of Proof, WASH. POST, May 14, 2006, (Magazine), at 8-11
(recounting the effort to exonerate Coleman). Following the Coleman execution, Jim
McCloskey read his last words for those in attendance: "'An innocent man is going to be
murdered tonight. When my innocence is proven, I hope Americans will realize the injus-
tice of the death penalty as all other civilized countries have."' Id. at 10.
170. Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Man Executed by
Va., WASH. POST, Jan. 13,2006, at Al.
171. Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and its
Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 289, 296 (2003) (examining the effects of political factors
such as "presidential and gubernatorial election cycles, whether a governor granted clem-
ency during an administration's 'eleventh hour,' whether state court judges are elected,
and a governor's background characteristics").
172. Id. at 295 (footnote omitted).
173. Matthew Mosk, Ehrlich Prolific in Granting Clemency, WASH. POST, Aug. 25,
2006, at Al (noting that Governor Robert Ehrlich granted clemency for a variety of rea-
sons during his first term).
174. See COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1-4 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.
il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission report/summary-recommendations.pdf.
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perpetrator of the crime.' The moratorium was supplemented with the
recommendations of the Ryan Commission-a collection of political fig-
ures, law enforcement officials, and legal experts. 176 The Ryan Commis-
sion proposed a variety of measures in response to systemic problems in
Illinois, including, a requirement that the trial judge concur in jury impo-
sitions of death sentences, 77 a prohibition of death sentences for the men-S 178
tally retarded, and provisions allowing for newly-discovered evidence in
post-conviction proceedings. 179 This type of executive intervention is al-
ways available to aid the wrongly convicted. However, federal and state
legislative remedies may offer the most hope for the fair administration
• 1 8 0
of justice in extreme cases of actual innocence.
2. Legislative Remedies
a. Federal Solution: Innocence Protection Act of 2004
Proponents of post-conviction DNA testing lauded Congress for its
passage of the Innocence Protection Act (IPA) of 2004, which is con-
tained in the Justice For All Act of 2004.1 Vermont Democratic Senator
175. Id. at 7-9. Among the death row inmates to have their sentences commuted were
two members of the infamous "Ford Heights Four." The four men, including Verneal
Jimerson and Dennis Williams who were on death row, were exonerated after DNA test-
ing failed to physically link any of the men to the crime. Id. at 8.
176. Id. at v-vii.
177. Id. at 33-34.
178. Id. at 34.
179. Id. at 35-36.
180. See Freedman, supra note 125, at 318 (espousing the potential of "vertical federal-
ism," that is distilling power down to the most politically accountable local unit, to solve
the problem of post-conviction innocence claims, while criticizing those who claim "hori-
zontal federalism" is the appropriate answer). But see Posner, supra note 64, at 90. Es-
pousing pragmatism and modesty as judicial virtues, Judge Posner points out that when the
Court strikes down or avoids a particular policy-based law or regulation, the Court has
made the political judgment for us-we will never know if the policy works:
The pragmatist wants to base decisions on consequences-and it is very difficult to
determine the consequences of a challenged policy if you squelch it at the outset. The
Holmes-Brandeis idea of the states as laboratories for social experimentation is both
quintessentially pragmatic (the term that John Dewey, the great pragmatic philoso-
pher, preferred for his philosophy was "experimentalism") and a fundamental princi-
ple of judicial modesty.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted). This view runs counter to Freedman's inherent distrust in the
state-based approach. Freedman, supra note 125, at 318.
181. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy DNA/Death Penalty Re-
form Bill Poised to Become Law This Weekend (Oct. 30, 2004), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200410/103004A.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
Leahy Press Release]; Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Innocence
Protection Act (Aug. 2002), available at http://usccb.org/sdwp/national/ipa809.htm ("Al-
though it will not end the use of capital punishment, the U.S. Bishops have supported the
IPA because it will help protect innocence people from being executed").
[Vol. 56:227
Handling Claims of Actual Innocence
Patrick Leahy introduced the law in 2000, and hailed its passage as "a
rare example of bipartisan cooperation for good causes.', 8 2 The Act pro-
vides for post-conviction DNA testing in applicable federal cases,"' the
preservation of biological evidence," funds to help states "defray the
costs of post-conviction DNA testing, '. and other incentives granted to
states who comply with federal standards.8 This legislation is important
not only for its bipartisan support, but also for the development of alter-
natives to federal habeas corpus relief.]87
The passage of the IPA and AEDPA represent considered and legiti-
mate exercises of congressional power. Professor Kent Scheidegger
refutes the claim that limitations to federal habeas corpus violate the con-
stitutional rights of state prisoners because they have no "right" to this
remedy:
In the proper exercise of this power, Congress has chosen a mid-
dle ground of preclusion, similar to the doctrine of the law of the
case. Stated another way, Congress has chosen to limit the ha-
beas remedy to cases where the state court decision is clearly
wrong, resolving doubtful cases in favor of the finality of the
judgment."l9
Scheidegger's conclusion is consistent with an originalist approach; un-
der this school of thought the democratically elected branches of gov-
ernment are better suited to make a determination as to which scope of
• 190
federal review is appropriate over final state court judgments. The pas-
182. Leahy Press Release, supra note 181. See generally Justice For All Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
Though ultimately hailed as a bipartisan effort, the Act did not garner widespread Repub-
lican support until the post-conviction DNA testing provisions were joined with provisions
giving funding and other resources to law enforcement interests. See Peter Baker, Behind
Bush's Bid to Save the Innocent, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,2005, at A9.
183. See Justice For All Act § 411, 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 2004).
184. See § 411, 18 U.S.C. § 3600A ("[T]he Government shall preserve biological evi-
dence that was secured in the investigation or prosecution of a Federal offense, if a defen-
dant is under sentence of imprisonment .... ").
185. Id. § 412, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14136e (West 2005).
186. See id. § 413,42 U.S.C.A. § 14136 (West 2005).
187. Id. § 411, 18 U.S.C. 3600A ("Nothing in this section shall provide a basis for relief
in any Federal habeas corpus proceeding.").
188. See Scheidegger, supra note 64, at 891-92 (defending provisions of AEDPA,
Scheidegger proposes that Congress is on strong constitutional footing with respect to the
limits placed on federal habeas corpus under AEDPA).
189. Id.
190. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989) (arguing that, while admittedly less than perfect, an originalist approach to constitu-
tional cases should be preferred). Justice Scalia argues that the Court should leave such
matters to the elected branches as they are not really acting as judges when determining
the contemporary scope of fundamental values, writing: "It is very difficult for a person to
discern a difference between those political values that he personally thinks most impor-
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sage of AEDPA and IPA demonstrates that our elected representatives
are able to address perceived abuses of the federal habeas corpus system
while preserving remedies for prisoners with the strong claims of inno-
cence that exculpatory DNA testing can provide.'9'
b. State Legislative Remedies
State legislatures also have debated, proposed, and enacted a variety of
post-conviction remedies to deal with claims of actual innocence. 9 From
2000 to 2004, one observer found that state legislatures around the coun-
try enacted at least sixty laws that provide for post-conviction DNA test-
ing, the retention of biological evidence, or other procedural remedies.9
Undoubtedly, many of these bills were passed in anticipation of federal
funding made available under the IPA.'94
tant, and those political values that are 'fundamental to our society."' Id. at 863. Judge
Posner also advocates such judicial restraint by the Supreme Court when facing constitu-
tional cases:
A constitutional court composed of unelected, life-tenured judges, guided, in deciding
issues at once emotional and politicized, only by a very old and in critical passages
very vague constitution (yet one as difficult to amend as the U.S. Constitution is), is
potentially an immensely powerful political organ-unless, despite the opportunities
that are presented to the Justices, they manage somehow to behave like other judges.
Posner, supra note 64, at 40. But see Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 469, 470 (1981) (arguing that judges cannot remove substantive political judgments
from their rulings in constitutional cases). Professor Dworkin counters the originalist and
judicial restraint argument with the assertion that this approach merely disguises value-
laden, political judgments: "Judges cannot decide what the pertinent intention of the
Framers was, or which political process is really fair or democratic, unless they make sub-
stantive political decisions of just the sort the proponents of intention or process think
judges should not make." Id.
191. See generally supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
192. DNA Resource, Post Conviction DNA Legislation, http://www.dnaresource.info/
documents/2003PostConvictionLegislation.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
Post-Conviction DNA Legislation] (discussing state post-conviction DNA legislation as of
December 2003).
193. DNA Resource, DNA Database Legislative Expansion, http://www.dnaresource.
info/expansion.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (listing state bills relating to post-conviction
DNA testing by year).
194. See Memorandum from Sarah Tofte to Innocence Network Members (Dec. 8,
2004), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/JFAAMemo.pdf (reviewing
provisions of the federal Innocence Protection Act that might provide states with funding
for post-conviction DNA testing and other state programs). Additional incentives for the
states to provide post-conviction assistance can be found in AEDPA, wherein Congress
structured the Act to offer states the incentive to provide adequate representation to pris-
oners attacking their judgments in state courts. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 138
(1999). By investing money and resources in the representation of prisoners at the state
level, AEDPA offers "a quid pro quo arrangement" to the states, whereby "there is expe-
dited review of any subsequent federal habeas corpus petition, limitations on the peti-
tioner's ability to amend the federal petition, and restrictions on a federal court's review of
the merits of the federal petition." Id. To exploit these special federal habeas limitations,
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This movement by the states, even in traditional "tough on crime"
states like Virginia,195 toward giving state prisoners a chance to raise post-
conviction claims of innocence, is encouraging.1 96 Further, this movement
begins to call into question the argument that states cannot be trusted to
ensure post-conviction justice.
III. THE STATE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IS WELL-DESIGNED TO
ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS
The proposition that the United States Constitution was not created to
solve each and every problem we face as a nation is not a new one.98
This adage rings especially true in the context of federal habeas applica-
tions based primarily on newly discovered DNA evidence-given the mul-
titude of local solutions, why flood the federal courts with cases that do
not even raise an issue of federal law? The effect of a broad interpreta-
tion of the role of federal habeas corpus is a burden on both the state199
the state must have offered court-appointed counsel to all state prisoners serving a capital
sentence. Id.
195. See, e.g., Teresa Welsh, Kilgore Campaign Comes to Emporia,
http://www.vancnews.com/articles/2005/09/05/emporia/news/news0l.txt (last visited Oct.
30, 2006) (quoting gubernatorial candidate Jerry Kilgore: "'I don't think that is a bad thing.
I'm proud Virginia is a tough-on-crime state."').
196. See Glod, supra note 165 (stating that prior to Virginia's post-conviction DNA
testing law, the prisoner here would have had no right to the testing that ultimately exon-
erated him); see also Michael D. Shear, DNA Database Touted by Police, Prosecutors:
More Funding Urged for State Resource, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2002, at T3 (citing Vir-
ginia's voter-approved amendment giving the Virginia Supreme Court the power to hear a
prisoner's claims of actual innocence based on DNA evidence).
197. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 125, at 319 (expressing doubt in the states' ability
to resolve this problem: "[T]he idea of permitting the states to experiment with a process
that determines whether a person lives or dies is, or should be, unacceptable").
198. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 358
(1981) (criticizing the so-called "due substance" theorists). Professor Monaghan describes
the due substance theorists' view that "the constitution guarantees against the political
order most equality and autonomy values which the commentators think a twentieth cen-
tury Western liberal democratic government ought to guarantee to its citizens." Id. (em-
phasis omitted). Professor Monaghan later describes the "perfectionist" view of the Con-
stitution as follows:
Perfectionism requires the continuous reformulation of the minimum ideal norms of
the polity, and the continuous application of the norms to varying circumstances.
Legislation may (and given the current explosion of civil rights enactments, frequently
does) embody those norms. Yet, a current schedule of extraconstitutional norms is
always "necessary" for a proper assessment and constraint of the workings of the po-
litical process. Otherwise, the constitution might begin to show the hallmarks of a
less-than-perfect document.
Id. at 390-91.
199. See, e.g., Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 3, at 948. The
availability of federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments burdens the states as
well as the federal system because the petitioner must first exhaust all possible state reme-
dies before turning to the federal courts. Id.
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and lower federal court systems.20 Although proponents of this broad
interpretation are quick to cite the potential miscarriage of justice in se-
lect cases, rarely is the delay in providing justice to the victims of violent
crimes mentioned.'O Additionally, such an expansive view of federal ha-
beas corpus operates as an affront to our federal system-empowering the
lower federal courts with a "quasi-appellate" role over the state supreme
courts.2  In the words of one commentator: "Federal habeas for state
prisoners is... quite simply, an exercise in judge-shopping. Because only
the defendant and not the state can file habeas, it creates a 'heads I win,
tails we take it over' system of review." 203
Instead of demonstrating the need to broaden our conception of when
federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners, cases like House dem-
onstrate that claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evi-
200. Id. Federal habeas applications by state prisoners rose from 127 in 1941 to 9542 in
1987. Id. The Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 1995 (the
most recent report from that Bureau) that the number of petitions in 1991, for example,
had reached 10,310. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 8 (1995),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf.
201. Not only is the plight of victims of violent crime rarely mentioned in this debate,
but the typical habeas petitioner has been convicted of a violent felony and has little
chance of prevailing. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 3, at 948-49.
202. Id. at 953 ("While federal review of the judgments of state courts has traditionally
been confined to direct review in the Supreme Court, the current habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion enables individual federal trial judges to overturn the considered judgments of state
supreme courts in criminal cases."); see also Scalia, supra note 190, at 862 (arguing that,
while admittedly less than perfect, an originalist approach to constitutional cases should be
preferred). Justice Scalia argues that even if the Constitution was intended to address the
evolving concerns of American society, there is no evidence that it was meant to address
such concerns in the courts:
A democratic society does not, by and large, need constitutional guarantees to insure
that its laws will reflect "current values." Elections take care of that quite well. The
purpose of constitutional guarantees .... [is] to require the society to devote to the
subject the long and hard consideration required for a constitutional amendment be-
fore those particular [original] values can be cast aside.
Id. at 862. He posits that in the past, unlike now, the Court "had the decency to lie, or at
least to dissemble, about what they were doing" in advocating a non-originalist view of a
constitutional provision. Id. at 852; see also Monaghan, supra note 198, at 396 (recognizing
that an emphasis on original intent and stare decisis in constitutional adjudication would
limit the Supreme Court in its ability to right the perceived wrongs of our society, Mona-
ghan proposes that "perhaps the constitution guarantees only representative democracy,
not perfect government").
203. Scheidegger, supra note 64, at 940. Explaining the structure of the federal courts,
Scheidegger observes that there is no support for any supremacy of the lower federal
courts over the state courts regarding federal questions; only the Supreme Court has this
power over the states: "The unique status of the Supreme Court as the only federal court
above the state courts can be seen throughout the constitutional debates and the Judiciary
Act." Id. at 899. Thus, Congress has the plenary power to, for example, abrogate Brown
v. Allen and remove the power of federal courts to hear state prisoners' claims entirely.
See id. at 891.
[Vol. 56:227
Handling Claims of Actual Innocence
dence can be difficult to address in the federal courts.'04 The fact that a
federal court of appeals sitting en banc was split over the claim lends cre-
dence to the notion that the federal courts might not be the most suitable
place to resolve such tough cases. The very same facts and procedural
posture resulted in a five-to-three split in the Supreme Court, where the
opposing factions not only weighed the newly presented evidence differ-
ently, but could not even agree on what standard to apply to the district
court's findings.24
Despite the skepticism, the local democratic process can be an effective
means by which the citizens of a state can determine for themselves when
a claim of innocence based on new evidence warrants the protection of
post-conviction safeguards.2 7 The voters of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia made that determination when they voted a collective "yes" on the
following proposed amendment:
[C]oncern[ing] cases in which someone is convicted of a felony
but is later able to prove his 'actual innocence' because of newly
discovered scientific or DNA evidence. Approval of this pro-
posal would make it clear that the state Supreme Court may con-
sider a claim of actual innocence without requiring that the claim
be filed first in a lower court.20 8
And Virginia is not alone; a consideration of enacted state legislation
from the year 2004 alone shows the willingness and ability of state legisla-
tures to address claims of actual innocence based on DNA evidence.2°
204. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 141; see also House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086-87 (2006).
207. See, e.g., Post-Conviction DNA Legislation, supra note 192. Note the variety of
state solutions to the post-conviction DNA testing issue-from Oregon's expansive testing
provisions allowing for relief at any time if grounds for innocence are established by DNA
evidence, to Missouri's more restrictive provisions requiring that:
(1) there is evidence upon which DNA testing can be conducted; and (2) the evidence
was secured in relation to the crime; and (3) the sample was not previously tested by
the movant because: (a) The technology for the testing was not reasonably available
to the movant at the time of the trial; (b) Neither the movant nor his or her trial coun-
sel was aware of the existence of the evidence at the time of trial; or (c) The evidence
was otherwise unavailable to both the movant and the movant's trial counsel at the
time of trial; and (4) Identity was an issue in the trial; and (5) A reasonable probabil-
ity exists that the movant would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had
been obtained through the requested DNA testing.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035(2) (2006).
208. Editorial, Virginia Ballot Issues, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at A22.
209. See H.R. 640, 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) (providing for post-conviction DNA testing
available at any time after conviction assuming certain threshold requirements are met); S.
44, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2004) (extending the cut-off date from two to four years for filing
a petition for post-conviction DNA testing-there is no time limit for petitioners who can
claim that they have new evidence that could not have been previously discovered by the
exercise of due diligence).
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These states have displayed not only the ability to conform state proce-
dure to advances in forensic science, but also the previously unheard of
ability to admit when their judicial processes have failed. °
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court had the opportunity in House v. Bell to recognize
the existence of freestanding actual innocence claims. However, the
Court declined to address the issue. Nonetheless, absent the truly "per-
suasive showing of actual innocence"21' alluded to in Herrera, a state pris-
oner's colorable claim of innocence based on newly discovered evidence,
such as DNA test results, does not necessarily require federal review.
Cries to expand the availability of federal habeas corpus beyond the re-
strictions apparent in both the Constitution itself and Congress' passage
of AEDPA, would be a disservice to the notions of finality in the admini-
stration of criminal justice, state autonomy, and enumerated powers of
the federal legislative branch.
On the other hand, a limited federal habeas corpus regime for state
prisoners who have exhausted their federal cause of action, allowing for
freestanding habeas review only in the rare "truly persuasive" showing of
actual innocence, would leave to the states the task of considering DNA-
based claims. This outcome would also support Congress' attempts to
prevent the flood of habeas corpus claims from overwhelming the federal
courts. Such a prisoner would already have had one shot at direct federal
review of his or her state conviction. Beyond that, it is evident that the
states are grappling with the best means of addressing these problems.
Well-conceived state statutory schemes provide the best, least arbitrary
means for DNA-based post-conviction claims to be heard and adjudi-
cated. If the early returns from the DNA age are any indication, the
states are beginning, however slowly, to get it right.
210. See H.D. 848, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004) (mandating that Julius Earl Ruffin,
granted an Absolute Pardon by Governor Mark Warner in 2003, be paid $325,000 on or
before Aug. 1, 2004, that he receive monthly annuity payments for thirty years totaling
$900,000, and that he receive up to $10,000 worth of free tuition within the Virginia com-
munity college system for technical training).
211. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429 (1993).
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